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Abstract  
Does registered land title help to improve tenure security and enhance one’s chances of securing 
a loan from formal financial institutions? This question continues to sharply divide opinions 
among academics, policy makers and international development partners. The long running 
debate on the subject of ‘Property in the Commons’, which serves as the ideological origin of 
what has become known as ‘Washington Consensus’  in contemporary times claims that there is 
positive correlation between the possession of registered land title and access to credit. However, 
this has often received considerable rebuttals. Even if the ‘Washington Consensus’ is accepted, 
the argument is still laced with some fundamental difficulty because it inherently assumes and 
treats financial institutions as a homogenous class of business. Yet financial institutions exhibit 
greater diversity in their operations and decision making process. This paper attempts to 
contribute towards developing improved understanding between the ‘secure land title and access 
to credit relationship’ by disaggregating financial institutions into Micro Finance and Universal 
Banks and examining what role secure land title play in granting credit from the perspectives of 
these two categories of financial institutions. To achieve this, field level investigations were 
conducted amongst officials of both Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) and Universal Banks in 
Ghana using structured questionnaires.   A total of 200 questionnaires – 100 each to MFI and 
Universal Banks were administered of which a response rate of 51 and 57 was respectively 
achieved.  The data was analysed using various non-parametric statistics. The study amongst 
other things established that universal banks and MFIs differ in their opinions on how important 
secure titles are in the lending process and the nature of the influence they can exert on the final 
lending decision. It was established that both categories of lenders do regard secure titles as 
important but whether or not it will influence their decision to accept a given landed property as 
collateral varies across lender types. 
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1 Introduction 
The importance of landed property to the socio-economic development process is well 
documented in the literature (North and Thomas, 1973 and Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986). 
Landed property is believed to constitute between 50-70% of the national wealth of developing 
countries (Bell, 2006). Majority of the people especially in the developing world are said to 
make a living out of land (World Bank, 2003). As a result, securing ones rights to such property 
is a critical matter to the very survival of the people. The International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD, 2008) defines property right security as the enforceable claims on property 
- it refers to people’s recognized ability to control and manage property. In other words security 
refers to one’s perception that his/her property rights will be recognized by law and, especially, 
by members of the society and protected when there are disputes or challenges to such rights 
(FAO, 2005; Abdulai, and Domeher, 2012). Other commentators have called for a more 
expansive interpretation of the concept of tenure security. According to Jean-Louis Gelder  
(2010, as cited in Obeng-Odoom and Stilwel, 2013), land tenure security arise from the 
concurrent existence of three factors. These are the legal security, de factor security and 
perceived tenure security. These three ingredients together ensure that there is legal clarity about 
land right as a result of a clear definition of one’s right or interest in the land. When all these are 
present, it means, people are protected from losing their land arbitrary. Indeed unjustifiable 
attempt to curtail one’s security of tenure can trigger enforcement action from the state or other 
designated authority (Abdulai and Domeher, 2012). Similarly, Obeng-Odoom and Stilwel (2013) 
have reiterated the need for a more holistic conceptualization of the concept of tenure security. 
They argue that the dominant narrative on the subject of security of tenure is narrow. 
Unsurprisingly, development policy interventions which are grounded on such incomplete 
diagnosis of the concept have proved to be defective and unresponsive over the years. As a 
result, there is an urgent need for a shift towards a broader conceptualization of security of tenure 
that addresses the legal, economic and social aspects of land holding (Obeng-Odoom and 
Stilwel, 2013).   
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Security of land tenure involves two forms of validation or recognitions - state validation by 
legal recognition and social acceptance at the local level. These two forms of validation must be 
both present to strengthen tenure security. Without recognition at the local level for instance, 
legal recognition alone may only succeed in making otherwise legitimate rights illegal whilst 
local recognition alone may be weakened without the backing of the national legal framework. In 
the absence of legal recognition many legitimate property owners may be cut off from the formal 
economy. Integrating local values on property ownership into the national legal framework will 
be the way to achieve both forms of recognition.  
 
 
In the quest to promote security of property rights, many have proposed property rights/title 
registration as the panacea to the problem of insecure rights to property. The provision of formal 
property titles is thus seen as a symbol of security and is expected to influence economic growth 
and poverty reduction in the developing world. In a typical customary land ownership context, 
documentation was historically alien to the indigenous communities. The introduction of title 
registration and other forms of documenting land rights are remnants of colonial era which is 
grounded on the casual assumption that lack of documentation results in tenure insecurity 
(Abgosu, 2000). It is worth noting that titling and other forms of registration only adjudicate and 
document the nature of rights and interest which exist in land. Therefore, outcome of title 
registration initiative is more likely to mirror ownership dynamics on the ground. It is therefore 
simplistic to equate formal titles to tenure security. Indeed there are several reported cases where 
titling has re-ignited latent land disputes and facilitated elite capture and have in the process 
exacerbated the vulnerabilities of the already marginalized (Bromley, 2008).  
Despite these obvious potential unintended adverse outcomes associated with title registrations 
in developing countries, donors from western countries and international development 
organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank continue to prescribe it. They argue that 
titling enhances tenure security, helps to secure investments; supports land markets to evolve 
more efficiently; improves access to formal credit and helps to reduce poverty and ultimately 
expedites economic development (Payne et al., 2009; UNECE, 2005; World Bank, 2006). The 
economic impact of formal property titles is derived from the assurance effect – certainty that 
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property owners will be able to reap the fruits of their investment and the collateralisation effect 
– the ability of property owners to use their properties as collateral for credit (Brasselle et al., 
2001; de Soto, 2000). With secure property titles, property owners who do not have funds to 
invest could obtain credit to undertake their desired investment activities through the 
collateralisation effect. Property registration through its security enhancing ability, is further said 
to improve on the collateral properties of land; making it a better, more secure and acceptable 
form of collateral that can be used to secure investment credit (de Soto, 2000).  
 
The renewed attention on the role of titling in ensuring access to credit which in turn improves 
economic development could be credited to the work of the Peruvian Economist, Hernando de 
Soto. In his book The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs In The West and Fails 
Everywhere Else, de Soto (2000) attributes the existence of high levels of poverty and 
underdevelopment in the developing countries to the fact that a very small proportion of property 
ownership is registered. He further posits that, the western world is highly capitalised and 
developed because of the existence of comprehensive property registration systems.  To further 
reinforce his proposition, de Soto provides this illustration: 
The single most important source of funds for new businesses in the United States is 
mortgage on the entrepreneur’s house….[when contrasted with developing 
economies]…..the poor inhabitants do have things but they lack the process to represent 
their property and create capital. [People] have houses but no titles, crops but no deeds… 
[and this explains why] people have not been able to produce sufficient capital (de Soto, 
2000, p. 7) 
It has been further argued that having formalized land titles could be important in resolving land 
related contestations.  This is because,  through the process of titling, property owners are issued 
with formal titles which are supposed to be prima facie evidence of ownership (Land Title 
Registration Law, 1986). Thus in times of disputes, the possession of formal titles do facilitate 
the dispute resolution process through the formal court system.   
 
In the developing countries a large proportion of people are employed in the SME sector (Abor 
and Quartey 2010). Yet this sector faces serious financing constraint that limits its ability to 
contribute meaningfully to economic growth. In the Ghanaian SME sector, a financing gap exists 
where the demand for finance by small businesses far exceeds the amount made available by 
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formal lending institutions, the imbalance between the demand and supply of credit has resulted 
in the situation where most of the loan applications are outrightly rejected or partially granted. 
For example, it has been established that only 28% of loan applicants obtained the full amount of 
the loans they wanted (Domeher et al., 2014). Stated differently, 72 percent of SME’s do not 
have access to the required credit. The above statistic is quite revealing and underscores the need 
for urgent action in tackling the financing problems faced by small businesses not only in Ghana 
but the developing world at large.  
There are several schools of thought regarding the reasons for the huge financing gap often 
reported amongst small businesses. In the developing world especially, a lot of emphasis has 
been placed on the lack of collateral in trying to explain the existence of this financing gap. For 
instance, an estimated 51% of all firms refused credit in Africa is said to be attributable to 
insufficient collateral; in East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin America and the 
Caribbean as well as South Asia, the estimates stand at 70%, 72%, 39% and 72% respectively 
(Fleisig, 2006).  
 
The dead capital thesis of de Soto (2000) added a further twist to the issue of collateral. He 
argues that the problem of lack of collateral should not be equated to the lack of assets per se but 
rather the absence of secure property rights over landed property which remains the most 
valuable asset of most people in the developing world. In any collateral based banking system 
(more prevalent in the developing world), Deininger (2003) argues that secure property rights  is 
a basic requirement for access to funds by businesses and households and this argument is re-
enforced by  Llanto (2007). These arguments have led to several investigations into the secure 
property rights and access to credit relationship. Yet most of such studies in Africa and other 
parts of the developing world have failed to establish a clear link between secure property rights 
and access to funding (Brown et al., 2006; Carter and Olinto, 2003; Galeana, 2004; Gilbert, 
2002; Petracco, and Pender, 2009; Place, and Migot-Adholla, 1998). That notwithstanding, the 
argument continuous to gain popularity amongst various governments and development partners 
leading to the massive rollout of various property rights registration programmes around the 
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developing world. Despite the considerable financial and technical investment, the anticipated 
result of improving access to credit remains largely unrealized (Harrigan, 2001).  
Even those studies that have established a positive relationship between secure property rights 
and access to funds (Boucher et al., 2005 and Feder et al., 1988), often treated financial institutions 
as a monolithic unit. Results from such studies therefore significantly fall short in helping to 
understand the influence of secure property rights within different cleavages of financial 
institutions such as Micro-Finance Institutions (MFIs) and Universal Banks (UBs). This paper 
aims to help in bridging this knowledge gap by empirically addressing these searching questions- 
do MFIs and Universal Banks rate the possession secure titles equally important in taking their 
respective lending decisions? Does the possession of secure titles have the same influence on the 
loan terms offered borrowers by MFIs and Universal Banks?  The rest of the paper is organized 
as follows: Section two and three are devoted to the literature and methodology respectively. 
Whilst section four presents and discusses the results, section five presents the conclusions and 
policy implications of the findings. 
 
2 SME FINANCING GAP 
Small and medium sized businesses have and continue to play a critical role in the economic 
development of most economies worldwide. It is common knowledge that in the developing 
world in particular, small businesses are tagged as the ‘engines of growth’. From small holder 
peasant agriculture, petty trading to hawking, small businesses have been central in the economic 
development of several developing countries, often serving as the primary source of livelihoods.  
It has been estimated that SMEs account for over 60% of GDP and over 70% of total 
employment in low-income countries, while contributing over 95% of total employment and 
about 70% of GDP in middle-income countries (Ayyagari, et al., 2003).  
SME’s are expected to drive economic development. According to the celebrated economist and 
philosopher, Amartya Sen, economic development should not only be gauged using parameters 
such as GDP and other statistical indicators. In his work, ‘Development as Freedom’, Sen (1999) 
posits that economic development should liberate people from such ominous conditions such as 
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unemployment and slums among others. However in Africa, these symptoms of under 
development remain pervasive (IMF, 2015; UN-Habitat, 2015), a situation which has prompted 
some commentators (such as Fjose et al, 2010) to argue that SME’s are largely failing to live up 
to expectations. Blaming SME’s for their inability to significantly contribute to economic 
development, without examining the challenges which confront them may be convenient but 
simplistic. SME’s require an enabling environment to thrive, with access to credit being a major 
factor. Worryingly, access to credit for further investment and expansion, especially from formal 
financial institutions remains beyond the reach of many SME’s (Domeher et al., 2014; Fjose et 
al, 2010). 
 
The theory of credit constraint is well discussed in the literature (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). It is 
argued that the presence of imperfect information creates uncertainties in the credit market and 
negatively affects the lending decision making process. Though there are several ways of 
mitigating this information imbalance between lenders and borrowers, collateral is often 
regarded as the most effective tool for fighting the twin problems associated with information 
asymmetry (adverse selection and moral hazard). That notwithstanding, the taking of collateral in 
itself is also constrained by information asymmetry. In the developing world, property ownership 
cannot be easily traced or validated; one cannot identify who owns what and addresses are 
difficult to verify (de Soto, 2000). For every asset that is to be used as collateral, lenders require 
essential information not only on its value or quality but most importantly its ownership and any 
third party interest in it.  
When property ownership information is not publicly available for easy verification, emphasis 
on collateral will rather create adverse selection and moral hazard where potential borrowers are 
most likely to present to the banks, properties that are under ownership disputes or some forms 
of encumbrances. In such a scenario, since the potential borrower’s claims to the property may 
be fraudulent or in dispute, incorporating the property into a loan contract will not provide the 
repayment incentive required to avoid moral hazard. In a nutshell information asymmetry on 
property ownership weakens the ability of collateral to reduce the credit constraint problem. As 
far as landed property is concerned, property rights registration solves the problem of 
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information asymmetry on property ownership and allows lenders to accept landed property as 
collateral and all other things being equal eases the credit constraint problem. Registered 
property titles are important because they generate useful signals about the borrower’s credit 
worthiness not only by merely serving as collateral but by providing information on 
unobservable borrower characteristics (Dower and Potamites, 2005). 
 
Apart from making credit available, the possession of registered property titles is believed to 
have an influence on the terms and conditions of the credit offered. De Laiglesia (2004) argues 
that secure property titles through its ability to raise land values and increase its liquidity could 
influence credit terms by increasing the amount of credit that is made available to borrowers as 
well as reducing the interest rate charged and enhancing other conditions. Field and Torero, 
(2004) note that the lack of secure titles to property creates mistrust among lenders with regard to 
the validity of ownership rights and increases the cost of verification to prohibitive levels. This 
could in turn affect the cost of credit. The diagram below provides a summary of the link 
between secure property rights and access to credit.  
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
Figure 1: The link between secure property titles and access to credit; Source: Domeher 
(2012b) 
 
Therefore, the key argument is that, for secure property titles to influence access to credit by 
SMEs, it must work through making landed property more acceptable as a form of collateral. 
Also, secure title should induce more favourable terms for potential borrowers. But how does 
this play out within Micro-Finance Institutions and Universal Banks? This is examined in the 
ensuing section.  
 
2.1 ACCESS TO CREDIT - A COMPARISON BETWEEN UNIVERSAL BANKS AND MFIS 
Universal Banks and MFIs represent some of the main sources of credit to households and 
firms. Increasing financing opportunities to firms and households helps them to take greater 
advantage of growth opportunities. Ehrmann et al (2003) identify credit from the banks as the 
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most important source of external finance for businesses. Despite this argument it is observed 
that the traditional banks and capital markets are often limited to individuals who are already 
well-off as well as the large business entities who can often meet the various loan requirements 
such as providing collateral. This leaves the sectors that need finance the most (SME sector) 
with finance limitations and thus stifling growth and welfare of society (Claessens, 2006). 
Traditionally, Banking institutions tend to shy away from lending to the SMEs because they are 
often perceived to be highly risky (Donkor et al., 2008). This perception often results in the 
banks implementing very strict collateral requirements when lending  to such businesses. Given 
the high poverty levels and the associated lack of asset ownership, many potential borrowers 
who are unable to meet the collateral requirements cannot access credit form the banks.  
Unfortunately borrowers with property to pledge as collateral also lack formal titles   restricts 
the acceptance of such property as collateral, thus  further contributing to financing constraint 
in a traditional banking system. The formal banking system has thus failed to adequately  
address the financing needs of the poor and the SME sector. As a result, SMEs mostly rely on 
informal sources to fund their business activities (Kakuru, 2008).  It is within this context that 
microfinancing becomes critical. The development of microfinance has been a response to deal 
with the failure of the traditional banking system which continues to exclude the poor and SME 
sector from receiving financial services (Aryeetey, 2008; Sonne, 2010).  Microfinance institutions 
(MFIs) specialise in the provision of small size financial transactions to poor households and 
businesses that could otherwise not have access to the bank system with the help of character-
based and other specialised lending techniques (Aryeetey, 2008). According to Cull et al (2006)  
MFIs are more flexible with collateral requirements than banks; for instance,  MFIs regard 
collateral as a tool for deterring loan default and not a tool for recovering loan as in the case of 
the banks,  therefore, they are more willing to accept most assets that can adequately deter 
default. Microfinance institutions incorporate some of the features of informal lending into their 
credit schemes through the use of the solidarity group strategy and providing a character-based 
substitute for collateral (Berger, 1989). 
Microfinance works on the principle that instead of the people going to the bank, the bank 
should rather go the people.  Furthermore, while traditional banking is based on the principle of 
‘the more you have the more you can get’ the main principle of the Grameen bank model of 
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microfinance is one of ‘the less one has, the higher the priority one receives regarding the 
granting of credit’ (Bahar, 2001). Microfinance may take various forms. One is the joint liability 
scheme first introduced by Grameen Bank in Bangladesh. Here small groups of individuals are 
formed and each group member acts as a guarantor for the other group members; (Sonne, 2010). 
In such instance, group solidarity is leveraged as a guarantee for credit, thus minimizing the 
need for physical asset which may be out of the reach of many SME’s and households.  This is 
because the group lending model involves a self-selection process which is used as a screening 
device and the inbuilt peer pressure and monitoring respectively reduces moral hazard and 
enforces loan repayment (Murdoch, 1999). The solidarity group approach also reduces 
transactions cost as it permits the bundling of very small loan amounts dealt with in one 
transaction (Berger, 1989). Each group plays an active role in the decision making process by 
selecting the beneficiary participants and deciding the amount of the loan subject to limitations 
on the amount and number of beneficiaries set by the institution. In this MFI model of lending 
failure to repay on schedule affects each member’s chance of getting any future credit, there is 
thus the strong incentive to keep up with repayment. Hence the model, only relies on social 
collateral in the form of group solidarity and accountability. 
 
MFIs also adopt a progressive approach to lending as a key for building long term relationships 
and trust to ensure continuous flow of funds to clients. Such relationship lending begins with 
smaller loan amounts which increase with each successive round of repayment success 
(Morduch, 1999). Clients have the assurance that the successful repayment of each loan received 
will pave the way for them to receive much larger loan amounts in the future. The repetitive 
interaction with the clients helps MFIs build a database of information on clients’ 
creditworthiness. It is in line with this that Morduch (1999) further observes that the repetitive 
nature of transaction as described above helps overcome asymmetric information and facilitates 
access to credit by the small businesses. It is thus clear that the mode of operation of traditional 
banks differ from that of the MFIs. Such inherent differences have implications for credit access. 
Therefore when arguments are made regarding SMEs access to credit, they should be placed 
properly within the context of the kind of financial institutions under considerations. 
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3 Methodology 
This study compares the role of secure property in the lending decision of MFIs and Universal 
Banks in Ghana. the quantitative research paradigm was considered more suitable for this study 
as it allows the researcher to test hypothesis/theories for relationships between various variables 
of interest (in this case the relationship between the possession of formal title, type of lending 
institution and credit access) (Creswell, 2009; Saunders et al., 2009) A range of key stakeholders 
were engaged through structured questionnaire during field level surveys conducted in 
2012/2013. During this period, the industry exhibited a mixture of various macroeconomic 
challenges and prospects which generally led to a rise in the loans portfolio of the entire industry. 
The extract below summarises the state of the market at the time. 
 The [Ghanaian Banking] Industry operated in a high interest rate environment for the 
best part of fiscal year 2012 shored up by government’s rather steep demand for liquidity, 
which led to a steep rise in Treasury bill rates, compared to the 2011 levels. In Ghana, the 
bulk of SMEs are within the Services sector, particularly hotels, restaurants, transport and 
storage business and real estate. These together contributed 49.3% to GDP in 2012, 
having grown at an annual rate of 8.8% over its 2011’s contribution. Gross domestic 
product (GDP) growth slowed from 14.4% in 2011 to 7.9% in 2012. Broad money supply 
including foreign currency deposits (M2+) grew by 24.3% in 2012, compared with 33.2% 
in 2011. Net Foreign Assets (NFA) of the banking system declined by 9.1% in 2012, 
compared to a growth of 37% in 2011. Headline inflation inched up from 8.6% in 2011 to 
8.8% in 2012. The average bank lending rates, however, declined from 25.9% in 
December 2011 to 25.7% in December 2012, effectively narrowing the interest rate 
spread to 13.2% in December 2012, compared with 18.2% in the same period of 2011. 
Net industry loans and advances grew by GH¢3.9billion (44%) compared to 2011. 
Notwithstanding that interest rates on treasury bills increased from 10.3% in 2011 to 23% 
as at end of 2012, the relative proportion of bank investment in cash and liquid assets as a 
percentage of industry operating assets declined as all the banks grew their loan 
portfolios in 2012. We believe the strong growth in credit in 2012 after a downward trend 
over the last four years is driven by demand side factors, a reflection of banks’ 
expectation of short to medium term economic prospects as well as renewed confidence 
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of banks in their own internal credit appraisal and monitoring processes 
(PriceWaterHouse Coopers, 2013).   
 
 
 The survey was thus conducted at a period where granting of credit by banks and other financial 
institutions was fairly vibrant. The survey involved Credit Officers, Loans Mangers and Branch 
Managers from financial institutions selected from the Ashanti region which is one of the ten 
administrative regions in Ghana. The choice of this region was based on the fact that it is one of 
the biggest commercial centers with several active Universal Banks and MFIs.  The Ashanti 
region is in the middle belt and has population characteristics reflecting a good blend of the 
north-south characteristics. It is the most populated region in the country according to the 2010 
census (Ghana Statistical Services, 2012). Furthermore, it was one of the only two regions 
(greater Accra and Ashanti regions) in the country covered by functional land title registration 
(admittedly Savelugu in the Northern region and Ewutu Senya in the central region had been 
declared as title registration districts, however title registration activities had not taken off at the 
time) . Of the two regions, the Ashanti region was chosen for convenience given the researchers 
knowledge of the region.  
The institutions involved were stratified into Universal Banks and Microfinance institutions. The 
participating financial institutions were identified based on information provided by the Bank of 
Ghana (BOG) on the institutions licensed to operate (Bank of Ghana, [BOG], 2012). These 
institutions have branches within the Kumasi metropolis. The  branches  that  were  selected  
were  those  easily accessible  to  the  researcher  by  way  of  proximity.  They  were  mostly  
branches  located  in  the Central  Business  District,  Ahodwo  area,  Suame-Magazine  area  and  
those  located  around  the Ejisu-KNUST  area. The individual respondents (identified above) 
from the selected institutions were purposively sampled since they constitute the key informants 
on issues of lending.  The information from the BOG website indicates a total of about 22 
universal banks, six savings and loans institutions; and 25 rural banks were operational in the 
Region (BOG, 2012). These institutions had various branches across the region. One hundred 
(100) questionnaires were distributed to the target officials (credit officers, loans mangers and 
Branch managers) in the various branches of the 22 Universal Banks. For 12 of the 22 banks the 
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researcher visited 2 branches each. For the remaining 10 branches only one branch each was 
visited because proximity issues. At each of these branches visited a maximum of 3 
questionnaires were distributed to the relevant officials (in some cases fewer than 3 
questionnaires were distributed). In the case of the 25 rural banks 20 of them were visited (1 
branch each). A maximum of 3 questionnaires were distributed at each branch visited. Two 
branches each of the 6 savings and loans institutions were also visited and at each branch a 
maximum of 3 questionnaires were also distributed. In all a total of 100 questionnaires also were 
distributed to the rural banks and savings and Loans institutions together classified in the study 
as MFIs. The researchers visited various branches of these institutions and approached the 
relevant categories of officials with the questionnaire; official who expressed interest were 
subsequently allowed some days to complete the questionnaire and return it to the researcher on 
an agreed future date. Out of this, a response rate of 57% and 51% was respectively achieved for 
Universal Banks and MFIs.  
Admittedly, the use of convenience sampling in the study as described above could have 
introduced some form of biases. However, this potential bias was offset by the fact that these 
financial institutions often have standardized procedures in making their lending decisions. 
Hence the particular branch chosen to participate in the study did not really matter much. 
Secondly the questionnaires were structured to ensure internal consistency in the responses. This 
thus ensured the reliability of the responses. The survey solicited the views of participants (using 
a likert scale) on the eligibility of landed property for use as collateral in relation to the 
possession or non-possession of formal property titles. To do this, respondents were first asked to 
indicate how much they agree or disagree that unregistered property is eligible for use as 
collateral (using a 5 point scale: 1 = strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree); to check for 
consistency in the responses, participants were later asked to indicate which kind of documents 
they accept as proof of property ownership and these responses compared. This served as an 
inherent control mechanism to validate responses. Respondents were also asked to indicate in 
order of importance which attributes they look out for when accepting landed property for 
collateral purposes (using a six point scale where ranks of 5 and above meant the attribute is 
critically important and cannot be ignored, from 3 – 4 meant attribute may be ignored though 
important and below 3 meant the attribute was of least importance and should be ignored). 
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The questionnaire further sought to sample opinions on the nature of the influence that the 
possession of formal titles may have on credit access for investment purposes. In effect, the 
study sought to explore whether or not the possession of secure title increases the likelihood of 
obtaining credit and whether the terms of such credit are more favourable compared to those 
without secure titles. The data obtained was entered into the statistical package for social 
scientist (SPSS) and mainly analyzed using descriptive statistics and non-parametric tests such as 
the: the Mann-Whitney test, Chi Square test. The results and discussion are presented in the next 
section. 
4 Results and Discussions 
4.1 Respondent Characteristics 
A summary of the demographic characteristics of the respondents sampled in this study is 
displayed in Table 1 below. A total of 108 Bank officials participated in the survey. Majority of 
these respondents (64.8%) were males; the median age of respondents was 30-45years (48%).  A 
little more than half of the sample (about 53%) was made up of respondents from Universal 
Banks (UBs); 27% from rural banks (RBs) and the rest from savings and loans companies 
(S&Ls). For the purpose of the analysis here, the respondents from RUs and S&Ls were 
classified as microfinance institutions (MFIs). The number of years a participant had spent with 
the current employer was used as a proxy for the level of familiarity with the institution’s 
policies on the subject matter whilst the number of years the reported position has been held was 
used as a measure the level of experience. Only 31.5% of these respondents have been with their 
current institutions for less than 5 years compared to 68.5% who have being at their current 
institution for at least 5 years. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Table 1: Demographic characteristics of bank officials 
This could be an indication of a good staff retention rate within the lending institutions; the 
majority of these participants thus had ample knowledge of the policies and practices of their 
institution as far as lending to small businesses is concerned. About 50% gave their job 
designation as credit officers; the other 50% were either loans managers or branch managers. 
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The results also show that apart from the few respondents (36%) who had held their current 
reported positions for less than 5 years, 64% have being in their position for five or more years; 
the median number of years in the reported position was 5-10 years. This indicates that the 
sampled respondents have good amount of experience in dealing with credit issues and were as 
such well placed to respond to the question posed; the responses given could thus be considered 
as quiet reliable. 
4.2 Secure Titles and Acceptability of Landed Property by Lenders 
In order for the possession of secure property titles to influence credit access, it must be a 
cardinal factor which lenders highly prioritize in their decision making. The study sought to 
determine whether or not secure titles are required to make property eligible for use as collateral. 
From Table 2 below a total of 45.4% of all 108 participants agree with the assertion that 
registration is necessary to make landed property an acceptable collateral asset; in other word 
these lenders do regard the possession of formal titles as a necessary requirement when taking 
landed property. Those who agree that registration is not necessary constitute 38% of the sample 
whilst the remaining 17% neither agreed nor disagreed. The chi square test in Table 2 below 
shows however, that respondents’ attitude to the indispensability of secure registered title when 
accepting property based collateral varies between Banks and MFIs. For the MFIs, 56.8% agree 
that registration is not necessary to make property eligible collateral compared to 21.6% who 
disagree. On the contrary, only 21.1% of UBs agree that registration is not necessary vis-à-vis 
66.7% who disagree. The chi square test as indicated in Table 2 below thus confirms that a 
significant association exists between the perception on the eligibility of unregistered property as 
collateral and the type of lender. Thus unlike MFIs, Banks on average do perceive the possession 
of secure registered titles as a necessary condition that must be met to make property acceptable 
as collateral. 
All the respondents (108) in this study indicated that they require documentary proof of property 
ownership when taking property as collateral to secure credit. Per this finding it can be said that 
in Ghana most property owners will be unable to use their properties as collateral in that about 
70% of such properties are owned under the customary system where ownership is mostly 
undocumented (World Bank, 2011). Respondents were asked to indicate which kinds of property 
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documents are acceptable to them. Though all lenders taking property as part of the conditions 
for granting a funding request require documentary evidence of ownership, the kinds of 
documentation required however vary but were broadly classified into three groups: registered 
documents only, unregistered documents only and a combination of registered and unregistered 
documents. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
Table 2: Chi square test for association between the type of lender and lenders’ perception on the statement 
that property registration is not necessary (RENNEC) to make landed property suitable for use as collateral. 
  
The results indicate that overall, 53% (57 respondents) accept both registered and unregistered 
documents as proof of ownership, 47% (51 respondents) accept only registered documents such 
as title certificates or registered deeds/lease but none of the respondents accept only unregistered 
documents like allocation papers and unregistered deeds. From Table 3 below, about 82% of all 
51 lenders who accept only registered documents are Banks. About 74% of those who accept 
both registered and unregistered documents are MFIs. Therefore the probability that both 
registered and unregistered property will be accepted by lenders was 0.26 (26%) for Banks and 
0.82 (82%) for MFIs. The chi square test in Table 3 below thus revealed a significant association 
between the lender type and the type of property documents accepted. Compared to MFIs, 
Universal Banks are more likely to request for registered documents as a condition for lending. 
Stated differently, MFIs are more likely to accept unregistered property titles as collateral. This 
is consistent with earlier results (already reported above) that Universal Banks unlike MFIs 
generally did not consider unregistered property as eligible for use as collateral. Indeed it is not 
out of place for universal banks to insist on formal titles as part of the conditions for advancing 
credit in that secure property rights promotes the development of active property markets (Feder 
and Nishio, 1999); the saleability of such property is thus greatly enhanced during default. 
Evidence suggests that there is a direct relation between secure tenure and investment in landed 
property (Feder and Nishio, 1999) the ability of formal titles to enhance tenure security leads to 
an appreciation of property values (De Soto, 2000; Payne et al., 2009). Brown et al. (2006) for 
instance, observe that land values could appreciate by about 25 percent or higher upon 
registration. Durand-Lasserve and Payne (2006) also estimate that the market value of land 
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appreciates by at least 20-60 percent upon registration. These together render any property 
covered by formal title a better and more acceptable form of collateral that can facilitate the 
credit delivery process for the Universal Banks. MFIs usually will lend small amount over time 
in order to build long time trust. Furthermore, where there is lending to a group, the solidarity 
which is generated from such collective body acts as further collateral. These are additional 
layers of security from the point of view of the MFIs. So despite the fact that they are inclined to 
accept evidence of property ownership other than registered titles, MFIs have some inherent 
mechanisms which help to minimize the likelihood of default.  
  
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
Table 3: chi square test for association between types of property documents accepted and lender type 
 
From the perspective of both MFIs and Universal Banks, the result on the eligibility of 
unregistered property rights (which roughly translates to tenure insecurity, see de Soto, 2000) 
confirm to some extent arguments by Dower and Potamites (2005) that property can be used as 
collateral even if it is not formally registered.  This appears to contradicts de Soto’s (2000) 
argument that unregistered property is ‘dead capital’ and cannot be used as collateral for credit. 
Indeed, de Laiglesia (2004) also established that 68% of the private banks in his study required 
registered property whilst only 6.7% accepted unregistered property. The dead capital thesis may 
hold true to some extent, particularly from the perspective of the Universal Banks which appear 
to give much attention to formalized land title in the lending decision making process. The 
difference in attitude of Universal Banks and Microfinance Institutions towards formal property 
titles can be explained by the inherent differences in their modes of operation. As a result of the 
low-income levels in Ghana most households and businesses cannot meet the capacity 
requirement of the traditional banking institutions; therefore to be able to provide sustainable 
finance to businesses,  banks tend to seek for dependable collateral (Boamah, 2010). As far as 
landed property is concerned the absence of formal titles weakens the dependability of such 
collateral. Adequate security is a requirement if financial institutions are to grant loans to 
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businesses and households; indeed a weak regulatory framework also has the ability to 
undermine the adequacy of the collateral (Boamah, 2011). The issuance of formal titles on 
property integrates the existing informal ownership of property into the formal economy with 
strong legal protection over such ownership. This then enhances the dependability and adequacy 
of such collateral paving the way for businesses and individuals to more easily access funds from 
the banks. MFIs on the contrary attempt to ease credit access by that segment of society that 
would find it difficult obtaining funding from the Banks. This is done by using a lending model 
which mimics the characteristics of informal lending. According to Kotir and Obeng-Odoom 
(2009) informal credit does not involve stringent lending conditions such as collateral. Hence 
MFIs have become popular among low income households and small businesses which are able 
to obtain funding from such institutions without providing hard collateral. 
 
However, as observed from Table 4 below, more than a formal title is required if a given landed 
property is to be accepted by a lender as collateral. Hernando de Soto’s claim that registered title 
almost guarantees access to formal credit is therefore over simplification of the complexities 
involved in the lending decision processes. The argument concerning the ineligibility of 
unregistered property therefore should be made within the context of the kind of lending 
institution under consideration. Indeed, it should be noted that in situations where other forms of 
collateral are more preferred to property, the issue of whether or not ownership of property is 
registered  has little or no weight (Domeher, 2012). Hence, to exert any influence on credit 
access through the eligibility of property for collateral purposes, collateral must first be regarded 
as necessary in lending to small businesses and secondly, property must be the lenders’ preferred 
choice of collateral. If these conditions are met, secure property titles will make property 
acceptable forms of collateral only within the main stream Universal Banks. Even after these 
conditions are met, secure registered titles will still not influence eligibility of property for use as 
collateral within MFIs per the findings of this study for reasons explained above. 
The eligibility of landed property for use as collateral should not be limited to the issue of formal 
titles alone since there are other attributes that lenders consider before accepting any given 
property. Hence, there is the need to compare these other attributes to the possession of formal 
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titles in terms of their level of importance. Table 4 below shows the ratings lenders assigned to 
the various attributes of landed property. The level of importance attached to the six attributes of 
property-based collateral did vary in some instances between the Banks and MFIs. For instance, 
Table 4 below shows that all the attributes except the kind of land rights held 
(freehold/leasehold) are rated as critically important by the Banks (Based on the median ranks)– 
an indication that Banks will not accept a landed property if there are significant deficiencies in 
any of the top five attributes in Table 4. MFIs on the other hand rated market value and 
availability of documentary proof of property ownership as the only critical attributes. Formal 
titles, insurance and location were however rated as attributes that may be ignored even though 
they are important. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
Table 4: Important attributes of land-based collateral by institution type 
                                               
The Man-Whitney test in Table 5 below shows no statistical difference between Banks and MFIs 
in terms of the level of importance attached to the following property attributes: property’s 
market value, nature of the rights held and availability of documentary proof of ownership. 
However, compared to MFIs, Banks attached a significantly higher level of importance to the 
following attributes: location, property insurance and registered property titles. The level of 
importance attached to property titles thus vary depending on the type of lender. The above 
results are consistent with what one would expect in practice because when lenders take 
collateral, they do so with the intention that during default the forced sale value will be sufficient 
to repay the outstanding debt. This explains why lenders typically lend amounts less than the 
estimated forced sale value of the collateral. Hence, the value of the property in itself may 
determine how much debt could be granted. Gilbert (2000) thus confirms in his study that 
whenever the lender has doubts about the value of the property other factors tend not to matter 
much in influencing their lending decision. This presupposes that lenders would equally be 
concerned with the ease of foreclosure of the property which is affected by the location of the 
property. Also when the potential borrower cannot provide documentary proof of their 
entitlement to the property, the above arguments will not even be considered. It is thus not 
surprising that these three attributes were duly rated as critically important (see Table 4 above). 
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Indeed, location may affect demand for and the value of the property. A property must be located 
in an area that can attract buyers more quickly to make it more acceptable collateral to lenders. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
Table 5: Man-Whitney test for differences between UBs and MFIs perception of the level of importance of  
               various property attributes. 
 
For instance, Lenders in Colombia are reported to have strict rules about the kinds of buildings 
as well as their locations that can be considered in advancing loans (Gilbert, 2000). Durand-
Lasserve and Payne (2006) observe that there is a significant reduction in efficiency gains of 
taking land-based collateral where the lender for instance, places a value on the location of a land 
parcel as a slum. Bromley (2005) also notes that a good house in a bad neighbourhood is always 
burdened by its surroundings and as such less acceptable to lenders.  
The results in Table 4 above show that whilst the banks consider registered property titles to be a 
critically important attribute that cannot be ignored in lending, MFIs do not give it an equal 
weight of relevance; This result for the MFIs is consistent with the observation by Gilbert (2000) 
that in Bogota, the most serious problem faced by formal lenders is not the absence of formal 
property property titles. In other words the failure by most applicants to obtain funding is not 
attributable to the non-possession of formal property titles. It also re-enforces the argument by 
Brown et al. (2006) that though registered property titles may be a necessary condition for using 
the property as collateral for a loan, it is by no means a sufficient one.  
4.3 Secure Property Titles and Loan Terms 
To investigate whether or not the possession of formal titles enhances credit access by 
influencing the loan conditions that borrowers are offered, the lenders were given a scenario 
involving two identical borrowers who only differ in terms of the kind of property they possess 
(registered or unregistered) and asked to indicate the extent to which they either agree or 
disagree that borrowers with registered property titles are offered lower interest rates, lower fees, 
allowed to borrow larger amounts and longer repayment periods. This was done using a five 
point likert scale where 1 is strongly disagree and 5 is strongly agree.  
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The results shown in Table 6 below indicate that about 59% of all respondents in the study 
disagreed with the statement that registered property owners are offered longer repayment time 
or larger loan amounts. Also, 62% and about 56% of respondents disagreed that registered 
property owners are charged lower fees and interest rates respectively. Only a minority of 
respondents in each case agreed that using registered property per se as collateral may attract 
better loan conditions relative to unregistered property owners (see Table 6 below).  The median 
rank of 2 for each of the loan terms in Table 6 below indicates that lenders generally disagree 
with the assertion that potential borrowers who possess registered property titles are granted 
better loan terms relative to those without registered property titles. 
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
Table : possession of registered property titles and its effect on loan conditions 
 
The Mann-Whitney test in Table 7 below indicates that no difference exists between the Banks 
and MFIs regarding their perceptions on the impact of registration on loan terms. Hence, even 
though MFIs accept both registered and unregistered property, they do not offer better loan terms 
to borrowers who possess registered property relative to those possessing unregistered property. 
This finding thus contradicts the argument of De Laiglesia (2004) that property registration 
through its ability to raise land values and increase its liquidity could increase the amount of 
credit that is made available to borrowers as well as reduce the interest rate charged. The above 
finding also contradicts that of Field and Torrero (2004) that in Peru, titled loan applicants on 
condition of receiving a loan, were charged interest rates that were on average 9 percentage 
points lower than untitled applicants.  
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
Table 7: Mann-Whitney test for difference between banks and MFIs regarding their perceptions on the impact of       
               formal property title on loan terms 
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 Migot-Adholla et al. (1991) found that the average maturity of loans to the households surveyed 
was less than a year and that the possession of registered title did not increase loan maturities for 
the sampled households. Place and Migot-Adholla (1998) also investigated the impact of 
registered property titles on loan size, interest rates and maturities and the extract below is what 
they established from their study in Africa. 
…Concerning loan maturities, the mean number of months for repayment of loan is 19.6 
on land-secured loans and 24.8 for others. As for loan amounts, the mean size of land-
secured loans is 10,146 Kenya shillings as compared to 8,753 shillings for others ($1 = 
Ksh 22 during the time of the study). Neither result is statistically significant and thus 
there is no evidence that land titles significantly alter the terms of formal sector loans 
(Place and Migot-Adholla, 1998, p.368) 
In the above studies, no evidence was found to support the argument that property registration 
significantly affects the terms of formal loans such as loan size, interest payment and maturity;  
Place and Migot-Adholla, (1998) suggests that the results be viewed with some caution since  
they did not stratify the loans according to the type of lender. This paper is thus consistent with 
that conducted in other parts of Africa by Migot-Adholla et al., and Place and Migot-Adholla. 
This study also goes an extra step to test for differences between types of lenders regarding the 
impact of property registration on the loan terms. By establishing that there is no significant 
difference between Banks and MFIs regarding the impact of registration on loan terms, this study 
has contributed to resolving some gaps which were left unaddressed by previous studies.   
The result on the impact of registration on loan terms is possibly pointing to the fact that lenders 
decisions on the kind of loan terms to offer are determined by other more important factors such 
as regulatory requirements, institutional lending policy, competition amongst lenders, the cost of 
funds, risk, lender borrower relationship and the general macroeconomic environment among 
others. In the case of MFIs for instance, the decision to offer better loan terms comes with every 
successful repayment made by the borrower. MFIs adopt a progressive approach to lending as a 
key for building long term relationships and trust to ensure continuous flow of funds to clients. 
Such relationship lending begins with smaller loan amounts which increase with each successive 
round of repayment success (Morduch, 1999). Clients have the assurance that the successful 
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repayment of each loan received will pave the way for them to receive much larger loan amounts 
in the future. On the contrary, when they default on a current loan, in the future, they may only 
obtain lesser amounts or nothing at all. 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Secure tenure has long been portrayed as the panacea to a range of the development challenges 
(FAO, 2012). As a result, securing land rights continue to gain traction. What has been 
problematic is the continuous equation of secure tenure to registered land right. This is what 
Obeng-Odoom and Stiwell (2013) describe as a reductionist trajectory. In their work, Obeng-
Odoom and Stiwell argue that the concept of secure tenure is multi-faceted, comprising of the 
tripartite concepts of legal, social and economic variables. As a result ‘secure tenure needs to be 
seen as a multidimensional concept and addressed through a correspondingly broad set of 
strategic policy initiatives’ (Obeng-Odoom and Stiwell, 2013, p. 328). By examining the findings 
of this study within the logic espoused by Obeng-Odoom and Stiwell (2013) it must be noted that 
the factors which influence lending decisions are complex and varied. These complexities are 
further compounded when the issues are examined from the continuum of Universal Bank and 
Microfinance institutions. This analysis highlights the need to reframe some of the ongoing 
critical development discourse, particularly the ‘dead capital thesis’.   
 
 
De Soto (2000) argues that the lack of formal property titles in the developing world is the cause 
of the credit constraint and high poverty levels; even though many of the poor are said to possess 
valuable landed property that could enhance their access to credit, such properties are said to be 
defective. As such, these properties are not a secure form of collateral for lenders to accept due 
to the absence of formally registered property titles over them. Available literature shows the 
media through which secure property rights can influence credit access to include: making 
property more secure and acceptable form of collateral and eventually also improving the terms 
of the credit offered borrowers. It is in this light that insecure property rights is believed to be a 
major hindrance to economic development in the third world (World Bank, 1975). The findings 
of this study have brought to the fore evidence that will help define the scope of this argument. 
Evidence from this study indicates that some lenders regard secure property titles as a 
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requirement to make landed property an acceptable form of collateral. However, further analysis 
revealed that this conclusion is more applicable to the Universal Banks than the MFIs. Hence, 
any argument relating secure titles to the acceptability of landed property by lenders must be 
made within the context of the right kind of financial institution. All lenders do regard secure 
titles as important but whether or not it will influence their decision to accept a given landed 
property as collateral varies across lender types. The implication is that any policy geared 
towards enhancing security of property rights will be greatly appreciated by lenders but the 
impact on the acceptability of such property and access to credit will depend on which 
institutions SMEs approach for credit. Empirical evidence from Ghana suggests that most SMEs 
often approach MFIs for credit facilities (Domeher et al., 2014). Therefore, since MFIs are found 
to accept both registered and unregistered property as collateral, registered titles per se will have 
an insignificant impact on SMEs credit access. It is probably in this light that Hammond (2012) 
observed that formal property titles make a rather insignificant beneficial contribution. If the 
only purpose of property registration is to make property more acceptable forms of collateral in 
Ghana, then these results call for a policy rethink. However if the trend of SMEs demand for 
credit in Ghana do change towards the Universal Banks then promoting property registration will 
do a great deal to enhance credit access.  
 
Ghana is currently undertaking land administration reforms through the Land Administration 
Project. The overarching objective of this initiative is to ‘develop a sustainable and well-
functioning land administration system that is fair, efficient, cost effective, decentralized, and 
that enhances land tenure security through…’ (World Bank, 2003, p. 3), As part of the strategies 
to achieve this,  land titles covering an estimated 300,000 parcels of urban land and at least 80 
allodial land owning bodies are expected to be issued. The reason for this policy direction is not 
far-fatched. Among others, it is expected to boost access to credit: 
 
[The need to] speed the processes for issuing land titles and documenting land rights in 
urban and rural areas [are critical to ensure]…secure tenure and facilitate access to credit. 
[These have] the potential to promote greater investment in the economy (World Bank, 
2011, p. 12) 
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So clearly, the ‘dead capital thesis’ is at play in the design and implementation of the Ghana 
Land Administration Project. It is believed that having formalized land titles would be important 
in resolving land related contestations. This is because, through the process of titling, property 
owners are issued with formal titles which are supposed to be prima facie evidence of ownership 
(Land Title Registration Law, 1986). Thus in times of disputes, the possession of formal titles do 
facilitate the dispute resolution process through the formal court system.   
However the premise of the dead capital thesis which argues that formal titles make property 
ownership secure (Adams et al., 1999; Deininger and Chamorrow, 2002; Kakuru, 2008) has been 
disputed by other empirical findings. For instance Abdulai (2012) found several instance in 
Ghana where formal titles issued got quashed in the law courts; the holders of such titles lost 
their rights to the properties without any compensations.  Even where formal titles exist, 
Kvitashvili (2004) argues that unenforceability of the related rights will expose the owners to a 
clear case of insecurity. The provision of formal titles through registration does not solve the 
problem of land disputes especially in the continent of Africa. As noted by Payne et al (2009)  in 
several areas including India, Mexico, Peru, South Africa, Tanzania, Senegal and Egypt, de facto 
security already existed before the introduction of land registration programs; indeed in 
Afghanistan and India for instance, it is reported that registration actually led to a reduction in 
tenure security. It is probably in this regard that Atwood (1990) argues that land registration 
could actually reduce security and lead to more conflicts. Elsewhere in Honduras and the 
Philippines the World Bank (2005b) further estimates that about 10% and 15% of registered 
lands respectively remain under ownership disputes. The above evidence can dampen public 
confidence in the formal titling process and affect the extent to which the titles eventually issued 
may influence the decisions of lenders. The empirical evidence therefore does not support the 
premise of the dead capital argument linking formal titles to credit access. On the face of the 
evidence, de Soto’s arguments appear flawed. It is hence not surprising when this study found 
that simply registering title to property, as a means of stimulating access to formal credit may 
only achieve very marginal results which will not be commensurate the enormous financial and 
technical costs which are associated with title registration initiatives.  This is in line with the 
observation by Obeng-Odoom (2013) that applying de Soto’s ideas through policy would be 
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ineffective in curbing poverty but could possibly fuel cynicism and fosters social discord.  In 
practice however property registration may yield benefits other than just enhancing credit access. 
Thus such programs should be promoted with the right motives. Furthermore, lenders across the 
various financial institutional types regarded secure titles as important, but the mere possession 
of a secure property title will not guarantee the borrower better loan terms/conditions compared 
to another borrower without formal title to property. Hence at best the possession of formal tiles 
to property may only make it more acceptable to lenders but that in itself is not a guarantee that 
the potential borrower will be offered credit neither is a guarantee that they will be offered more 
favourable loan conditions if indeed they do obtain the credit at all. Hence, there are other critical 
factors responsible for the SME financing Gap in the developing countries, these should be first 
established and once the relative importance of such factors is well established appropriate 
policy can then be designed towards addressing such critical determinants. Other than that 
governments will be prescribing the right medications for the wrong ailments.  
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